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How Efficient is Terrorism in Exerting Political Affect: The Case of Hamas?

In his guide ‘Terrorism: All That Issues’ Andrew Silke feedback, “The purest essence of terrorism is violence. This violence is carried out with the intention to compel an enemy to do the need of the terrorists,” and that, “Terrorism is certainly politically motivated.”[1] While undeniably adopted within the pursuit of political concessions, the efficacy of terrorism as an instrument for attaining these concessions is commonly disputed. On this essay, I discover terrorism in Hamas’s rebel marketing campaign in opposition to Israel. By this lens, I argue that terrorism is a reasonably efficient instrument of political affect that may help an organisation in reaching smaller and course of objectives, nevertheless, is an ineffective instrument for reaching bigger and consequence objectives. I discover how terrorism has been an efficient instrument for Hamas for reaching smaller and course of objectives by enabling the organisation to exert political affect by way of stifling the Oslo Accords, inciting Israeli concessions within the Second Intifada, and underpinning its rise to prominence in home Palestinian politics. I then discover terrorism as an ineffective means for pursuing bigger and consequence objectives by way of how Hamas has shifted away from terrorism due to how Israeli counterterrorism has successfully mitigated its influence, the way it has change into disincentivised as Hamas’s measurement and political capability have elevated, and at last, how Hamas has redefined its consequence objectives. As a dynamic organisation that exists in a continually evolving surroundings, Hamas should be ready to regulate its methods to replicate shifting political realities. In the end, I assert that terrorism will be an efficient political instrument, nevertheless, the extent of this effectiveness is restricted.

So as to perceive the political motivations that underpin Hamas’s use of terrorism, it’s important to know the historic context through which Hamas exists. Israel was created in 1948, protecting 78% of the British Mandate for Palestine.[2] Its legitimacy as a state has since been extremely contentious, however with its sturdy United States (US) backing, Palestinian struggles in opposition to Israel have been unable to compete militarily, economically, or politically.[3] The terrorism that has come to outline the Palestinian insurgency in opposition to Israel first rose to prominence within the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) campaigns through the Nineteen Seventies and Eighties, contributing to political inroads similar to United Nations and Arab League memberships.[4]

Nevertheless, the First Intifada (1987-1993) noticed a shift in PLO coverage towards non-violent approaches, compromise, and a doable two-state resolution.[5] Based in 1987 by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas endorses the beliefs that Palestinian liberation can solely be achieved by way of state-wide Islamisation and Israel’s destruction.[6] Since this inception, gaining energy has been Hamas’s best problem – an thought obvious in Fatah[7] chief Yasser Arafat’s 1990 description of Hamas as ‘ants’ throughout a time when Hamas possessed solely 3% home assist and an arsenal of an estimated 20 machine weapons.[8] Hamas’s objectives have since been to extend its home assist and army capability to pursue Israel’s destruction – an consequence objective outlined in Hamas’ Constitution which states in its preamble that, “Israel will exist and can live on till Islam will obliterate it, simply because it obliterated others earlier than it.”[9] Hamas has readily adopted terrorism by way of suicide bombings and rocket campaigns concentrating on Israeli residents in its efforts to say Palestinian sovereignty into the worldwide agenda.[10] Evidently, Hamas undoubtedly adopted terrorism to assist its political pursuits and to fight the asymmetry inherent to its insurgency in opposition to Israel. I’ll now discover each the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of terrorism for reaching these ends.

Hamas’s use of terrorism to stifle the Oslo Accords demonstrates how terrorism will be an efficient instrument of political affect, particularly when an organisation lacks conventional means for exerting this affect. The Oslo Peace Course of (1993-1995) was a concerted effort to convey peace and diplomatic relations to the Israel-Palestine battle.[11] Communication between PLO chief Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Yitzhak Rabin noticed Arafat recognise Israel’s sovereignty and resign terrorism, whereas Rabin recognised the PLO as Palestine’s consultant authority.[12] The Oslo I Accord sought to introduce a professional democratic course of in Palestine creating the Palestinian Authority (PA) to manipulate Gaza and far of the West Financial institution.[13] This shift in discourse towards compromise, concessions, and a two-state resolution ran in inherent contradiction to Hamas’s political identification and threatened to reshape the battle’s political and safety circumstances.

As a relative newcomer and small organisation, Hamas lacked the political clout to affect the negotiations themselves and sought various means for assembly these ends. Because the Accords’ most important opposition, Hamas discovered that suicide terror was capable of grant it an efficient energy of veto over the method.[14] The political significance of Hamas terrorism was to not forestall the Oslo Accords, however relatively to display a dedication to the Palestinian plight because the Accords did not ship on guarantees for security and safety. The Hebron Bloodbath of 1994 the place an Israeli act of terror took 30 Palestinian lives brought on many Palestinians to change into disenfranchised with the Accords for not assembly these safety guarantees.[15] In response, Hamas ramped up its terror marketing campaign, and a very profitable spell in 1996 that claimed 58 Israeli lives and compelled Israel to considerably ramp up its counter-insurgency efforts in Palestine, additional contributing to Palestinian insecurity and disenfranchisement with the Oslo Accords.[16] This aligns with Pape’s argument that the strategic logic of terror is to drive a authorities right into a no-win state of affairs the place it might both grant concessions or retaliate, which frequently stokes the general public’s assist for the terrorist trigger.[17] Hamas’s sustained terrorist marketing campaign through the Oslo Accords shifted home Palestinian discourse away from a two-state resolution by demonstrating each how the Accords couldn’t create the promised peace and safety and Hamas’s unwavering dedication to the Palestinian trigger. Subsequently, Hamas terrorism through the Oslo Accords portrays terrorism as an efficient instrument of political affect by enabling the organisation to pursue smaller and course of objectives at a time when it lacked conventional technique of political affect.

Hamas terrorism through the Second Intifada and Israel’s consequent withdrawal from Gaza once more reveals terrorism as an efficient instrument of political affect for reaching smaller and course of objectives in situations of serious asymmetry. The Second Intifada (2000-2005) got here with the resounding message from the Palestinian those that they’d now not be sure by the Oslo Accords.[18] The battle noticed a drastic rise in Hamas suicide terror, with the organisation conducting 112 assaults, which brought on 474 fatalities throughout 2000-2004, up from 27 assaults with 120 fatalities from 1993-2000.[19] As essentially the most harmful instrument in Hamas’ arsenal, suicide terror accounted for 73% of all deaths brought on by Palestinian resistance teams through the Second Intifada.[20] Hamas championed the usage of suicide terror as a result of it was an efficient means to bridge the asymmetry between Palestine and Israel. Hamas’s Secretary-Common of Jihad Ramadan Shalah supported this rationale by commenting, “[o]ur enemy possesses essentially the most refined weapons on the planet and its military is skilled to a really excessive commonplace … We’ve nothing to repel the killing and thuggery in opposition to us besides the weapon of Martyrdom.”[21] Suicide terror supplied an inexpensive, efficient means for confronting the extra highly effective Israel. Whereas every assault value Hamas an estimated US$150, in 2002 the Financial institution of Israel estimated the Second Intifada value Israel 3.8% of its Gross Home Product (GDP).[22] In earlier conflicts Israel had managed to include violence to enemy territory and the periphery; nevertheless, suicide terror inside Israel’s borders successfully slowed down manufacturing and broken the financial system, the place between 2000-2002 GDP Per Capita dropped 6% from US$18,358 to US$17,359.[23] The financial prices of the Second Intifada to Israel have been clearly important, with suicide terror permitting Hamas to threaten Israeli manufacturing and sense of safety.

Nevertheless, while the person assaults have been low-cost, this terror marketing campaign got here with important prices from Israeli retaliation. Certainly, while Israel in the end withdrew from Gaza in 2005, earlier retaliation had seen army incursions into Palestinian inhabitants centres, assassinations of top-level Hamas leaders, and restrictions of Hamas’s entry to worldwide and monetary assist.[24] It’s clear that terrorism generally is a counterproductive instrument, the place retaliation can result in important penalties, however when paired with unceasing resolve terrorism can incite political concessions. Hamas’s sustained terrorist marketing campaign through the Second Intifada pressured Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza by way of imposing important financial and safety prices, but additionally for profitable the battle of resolve. Subsequently, Hamas terrorism through the Second Intifada portrays terrorism as an efficient means for reaching smaller and course of objectives, the place asymmetry is critical.

Terrorism’s affect on Hamas’s election into the Palestinian Authority additional reveals how it may be an efficient instrument of political affect for reaching smaller and course of objectives, similar to constructing home assist. Hamas was elected to manipulate the PA in 2007, having gained 76 seats to Fatah’s 43 – a stark distinction to Hamas’s preliminary 3% home assist.[25] The evolution from a fringe group to the governing physique was derived from the Muqawama Doctrine, which emphasises self-sacrifice by way of a method of extended struggle designed to erode an enemy’s sources and resolve for an final victory by attrition.[26] This coverage, designed to solidify Hamas’s place on the Gaza Strip, concerned state-building insurance policies to determine governance and activist insurance policies to assist its international affairs agenda by way of terrorism and the cycle of battle with Israel.[27] The integral position of Hamas’s sustained terrorist efforts was to display unwavering resolve and to hunt an final victory by way of attrition.

Having seen a far larger proportion of its inhabitants killed by terrorism than every other democracy paired with a deeply insecure sense of public security, Israel has more and more grown to simply accept Hamas as a actuality that should be accepted.[28] It’s clear that Hamas has confirmed its unrelenting resolve by way of its terrorist efforts and their impacts on Israel. This shift within the rhetoric surrounding Israel-Palestine relations will be understood clearly with a 2012 ballot revealing that almost all Palestinians believed a two-state resolution was now not viable, and over two-thirds – that the probabilities of negotiations succeeding over the following 5 years have been ‘low’ or ‘non-existent’.[29] Evidently, by demonstrating unwavering dedication to the Palestinian trigger by way of a sustained terrorist marketing campaign, Hamas has shifted the home sentiment away from Fatah’s willingness for compromise towards its personal unwavering political aims, whereas additionally buying legitimacy within the eyes of Israel and the worldwide group. Subsequently, terrorism will be understood as an efficient instrument for reaching smaller and course of objectives for the way it assisted Hamas’s rise to energy inside home Palestinian politics.

To date, I’ve explored how Hamas’s use of terrorism reveals how it may be an efficient instrument for pursuing smaller and course of objectives. Nevertheless, an insurgency should be dynamic to replicate altering political realities and terrorism is simply a restricted means for pursuing political objectives. With Hamas’s consequence objective for Israel’s destruction remaining elusive, I’ll now discover terrorism as an ineffective means for reaching bigger and consequence objectives by way of the organisation’s shift away from terrorism since its election into the PA.

Terrorism will be understood as an ineffective technique of political affect for pursuing bigger and consequence objectives due to how efficient counterterrorism measures can render terrorist methods ineffective, consequently limiting the organisation’s political affect and forcing it to undertake various methods. In 2000-2007, Hamas’s terrorism turned much less efficient, the place a decline in casualties per assault was adopted by a decline within the variety of assaults themselves[30]. This lower in effectiveness stemmed from Israel’s capability for growing efficient counterterrorism methods, the place the Israel Protection Pressure demonstrated itself to be well-prepared for the scope and magnitude of weaponry utilized in Hamas assaults.[31] In mild of the diminishing effectiveness of suicide terror, Hamas assumed an intensive ballistic and mortar marketing campaign on the expense of effectiveness. While nonetheless instilling insecurity and disruptions to Israeli day by day life, rocket and mortar assaults got here with diminished efficacy inflicting solely 42 deaths throughout 2001-2009, in comparison with over 600 deaths from suicide assaults between simply 2000-2005[32], [33]. In 2011, Hamas’s chief political advisor Ahmed Yousef supplied the rationale for why Hamas had beforehand shifted away from suicide terror stating, “[r]ockets in opposition to Sderot will trigger mass migration, vastly disrupt day by day lives and authorities administration and might make a a lot huger influence on the federal government… We’re succeeding with the rockets. We’ve no losses and the influence on the Israeli aspect is a lot.”[34] That is according to Walter and Enders’ concept that perpetrators of organised violence will substitute new strategies to switch or complement these which are now not environment friendly.[35] Basically, as Hamas suicide terror turned much less environment friendly, the organisation sought various means for pursuing its political objectives.

Nevertheless, Israel’s counterterrorism has even been capable of restrict the effectiveness of Hamas rocket assaults[36]. Efficient Israeli counterterrorism efforts have considerably mitigated the results of Hamas terror methods, forcing the organisation to pursue various technique of political affect, and displaying the dynamic nature of terrorist campaigns. Subsequently, terrorism will be understood as an ineffective instrument of political affect for the way efficient counterterrorism can mitigate the impacts of terrorist methods and, consequently, their political affect. This forces the organisation to be dynamic and to pursue various strategies to elicit its desired concessions.

The Israel-Palestine battle additional reveals terrorism as an ineffective instrument of political affect for reaching bigger and consequence objectives as a result of it might change into counterproductive as an rebel organisation will increase its political authority. The place the asymmetry is extra extreme in a battle, the usage of terror is extra rational as a result of insurgents lack the favored backing or capability to attain their objectives by way of non-violent means.[37] This logic explains Hamas’s shift away from terror following its election into the PA. Having acquired extra political authority and clout, Hamas possessed larger means for exerting political affect, particularly as its army wing the Qassam Brigades, which was as soon as dominated by suicide bombings and low-cost mortar assaults, morphed right into a extra standard army drive.[38] In comparison with its preliminary arsenal of solely 20 machine weapons, the Qassam Brigades now boast 17,000-27,000 troopers, numerous rockets with a spread of 48-160 km, tons of of mortars, laser-guided anti-tank missiles, and the early stage of a drone program.[39] This transformation from a fringe organisation right into a extra standard rebel drive is vital for Hamas’s pursuit of its political objectives. Abrahms argues that terrorist campaigns see restricted coercive effectiveness as a result of governments resist complying when their civilians are the main focus of assaults and that of the terrorist campaigns which have achieved concessions, nearly all of them have concerned guerrilla campaigns in opposition to a state’s army.[40] Moreover, while the asymmetry on this battle remains to be distinct, as a professional authorities, terrorism is a counterproductive instrument for reaching worldwide legitimacy and assist. That is clear in how because the Second Intifada, components of the worldwide group have condemned Hamas’s persistent use of terrorism.[41] Evidently, the pursuit of Hamas’s political objectives requires it to be a dynamic organisation that may adapt to its altering political circumstances, the place since Hamas has elevated its energy and developed into the professional governing physique of the PA, terrorism is now not its dominant means for pursuing its political objectives and might usually be counterproductive. Subsequently, terrorism is an ineffective instrument for reaching bigger and consequence political objectives as a result of as an organisation will increase its political clout, different means change into more practical.

A ultimate illustration of terrorism as an ineffective instrument for reaching political objectives, significantly bigger and consequence objectives, will be understood by way of how Hamas has lately redefined and softened its consequence objectives. Hamas launched a brand new coverage doc in 2017 that, while nonetheless outlining a dedication to Israel’s destruction, denoted a shift in coverage towards a willingness to simply accept an interim Palestinian state.[42] This softens its preliminary stance specified by Article 13 of its Covenant that adopted, “… [Peace initiatives] are not more than a method to nominate infidels as arbitrators within the lands of Islam… There is no such thing as a resolution for the Palestinian drawback besides by Jihad.”[43] The shift in rhetoric illuminates the dynamic nature of Hamas and terrorist organisations – that because the political context evolves, so too should the organisation’s aims and strategies. Hamas’s 2007 election marketing campaign ran on a platform that resistance was a multi-faceted technique that included army operations, but additionally prolonged to governance capabilities.[44] The evolving context for Hamas has been the completely different expectations and obligations set for governments in comparison with smaller terrorist cells. This was particularly related following Hamas’s struggles through the three Gazan Wars (2009-2014), whereby the context of efficient Israeli counterterrorism that neutered Hamas’s conventional terrorist methods, public assist for Hamas dropped to 35% in 2014, down from 62% in 2007.[45] Since taking energy in 2007, Hamas’s largest problem has been governing Gaza, a problem aggravated by factional infighting, worldwide isolation, and the Israeli battle.[46] Whereas an armed group can settle for the prices of the Gazan Wars with out main penalties, as soon as elected to energy, Hamas took upon a mantle of duty that requires it to look out for its constituents’ wants.[47] Evidently, within the context of Hamas’s newfound governmental obligations, nonetheless elusive Palestinian sovereignty, and an lack of ability to exert political affect over Israel, Hamas is struggling to retain its identification as an efficient nationalist organisation. Subsequently, terrorism will be understood as an ineffective instrument for exerting political affect by way of Hamas’s latest softening of its consequence objectives and shift away from battle and terrorism towards diplomatic efforts.

To conclude, I’ve argued that Hamas’s terrorist campaigns in opposition to Israel display that terrorism is a reasonably efficient instrument of political affect. I’ve explored that whereas terrorism will be an efficient instrument for pursuing smaller and course of objectives when an organisation has restricted capability for political affect, it isn’t an efficient instrument for reaching bigger and consequence objectives as an organisation will increase its political authority. I’ve argued that terrorism is an efficient instrument for reaching smaller and course of objectives by way of how Hamas used it to stifle the Oslo Accords when the organisation lacked various means for political leverage; how sustained terror exercise through the Second Intifada incited Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza; and the way terrorism underpinned Hamas’s election into the PA by demonstrating Hamas’s dedication to the Palestinian trigger. Nevertheless, with Hamas’s consequence objective of destroying Israel remaining elusive, the Israel-Palestine battle demonstrates terrorism as an ineffective means for pursuing bigger and consequence objectives by way of how Hamas has shifted away from terrorism on account of efficient Israeli counterterrorism; how as a professional governing physique, terrorism is now not Hamas’s dominant means for pursuing its political aims; and thru how Hamas has softened its consequence objectives, shifting away from battle and terrorism towards diplomatic efforts. In the end, terrorism underpinned Hamas’s rise in political affect; nevertheless, Hamas’s shift away from terrorism means that it’s a restricted instrument of this affect. That’s not to say terrorism is redundant or ineffective, however relatively imperfect – an rebel organisation should be dynamic and ready to regulate its methods to replicate the evolving context through which it exists.


[1] Andrew Silke, Terrorism: All That Issues (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2014), 1-12.

[2] Ilan Pappé, Israel (New York: Routledge, 2018), 16.

[3] Ariel Roth, “Reassurance: A Strategic Foundation of the U.S. Help for Israel,” Worldwide Research Views 10(1) (2009): 390.

[4] Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, “The First Palestinian Intifada,” in Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Battle, ed. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (New York Metropolis: Columbia College Press, 2011), 122.

[5] Chenoweth and Stephan, “The First Palestinian Intifada,” 120.

[6] Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Battle: The Case of Hamas,” Center Japanese Research 34(1) (1998): 149.

[7] Fatah are the PLO’s political wing

[8] Daniel Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” The Washington Quarterly 36(3) (2013): 63.

[9] Hamas, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Motion,” August 18, 1988. Accessed March 5, 2021, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

[10] Jonathan Graubart and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, “David in Goliath’s Citadel: Mobilising the Safety Council’s Normative Energy for Palestine,” European Journal of Worldwide Relations 22(1) (2016): 31; Devorah Manekin, “Violence In opposition to Civilians within the Second Intifada: The Moderating Impact of Armed Group Construction on Opportunistic Violence,” Comparative Political Research 46(10) (2013): 1276.

[11] Tamara W. Cofman, How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Evaluation of the Oslo Peace Course of (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), i.

[12] Sen Somdeep, “’It’s Nakba, Not a Social gathering’: Re-Stating the (Continued) Legacy of the Oslo Accords,” Arab Research Quarterly 37(2) (2015): 163.

[13] Inside Story, “Palestine: What’s in a Identify (Change)?” Aljazeera, January 8, 2013, accessed March 8, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/program/episode/2013/1/8/palestine-what-is-in-a-name-change.

[14] BBC Information, “Profile: Hamas Palestinian Motion,” BBC Information, Might 12, 2017, accessed March 3, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522.

[15] Wendy Kristianasen, “Problem and Counterchallenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo,” Journal of Palestinian Research 28(3) (1999): 33.

[16] Kristianasen, “Problem and Counterchallenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo,” 26.

[17] Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terorrism,” American Political Science Evaluation 97(3) (2003): 343-344.

[18] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 64.

[19] Ali Wyne, “Suicide Terrorism as Technique: Case Research of Hamas and the Kurdistan Staff Social gathering,” Strategic Insights 4(7) (2005): 2.

[20] Nada Matta and Rene Rojas, “The Second Intifada: A Twin Technique Enviornment,” European Journal of Sociology 57(1) (2016): 66.

[21] Wyne, “Suicide Terrorism as Technique: Case Research of Hamas and the Kurdistan Staff Social gathering,” 2.

[22] Wyne, “Suicide Terrorism as Technique: Case Research of Hamas and the Kurdistan Staff Social gathering,” 3.

[23] Hillel Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Motion: Classes from Hamas,” Research in Battle and Terrorism 32(12) (2009): 1051.

[24] Robert Brym and Bader Araj, “Suicide Bombing as Technique and Interplay: the Case of the Second Intifada,” Social Forces 84(4) (2006): 1980-1981.

[25] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 63; Tareq Baconi, “The Demise of Oslo and Hamas’s Political Engagement,” Battle, Safety & Growth 15(5) (2015): 503-520.

[26] Daniel Baracskay, “The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Analyzing the Position of Political Pragmatism in State Constructing and Activism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27(3) (2014): 521.

[27] Baracskay, “The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Analyzing the Position of Political Pragmatism in State Constructing and Activism,” 521.

[28] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 66; Charles D. Freilich, “Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Coverage: How Efficient?” Terrorism and Political Violence 29(2) (2017): 371.

[29] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 69-70.

[30] Kirchofer, “Focused Killings and Compellence: Classes from the Marketing campaign In opposition to Hamas within the Second Intifada,”.

[31] Baracskay, “The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Analyzing the Position of Political Pragmatism in State Constructing and Activism,” 533.

[32] Hamas hardly used suicide terror after 2005.

[33] Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Motion,“ 1054.

[34] Israel Ministry of International Affairs, “The Hamas Terror Struggle In opposition to Israel,” Israel Ministry of International Affairs, March 2011, accessed March 3, 2021, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/pages/missile%20fire%20from%20gaza%20on%20israeli%20civilian%20targets%20aug%202007.aspx.

[35] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Insurance policies: A Vector-Auto Regression-Intervention Evaluation,” American Political Science Evaluation 87(4) (1993): 823.

[36] Israel Ministry of International Affairs, “The Hamas Terror Struggle In opposition to Israel”.

[37] Sverrir Steinsson, “Is Terrorism an Efficient Solution to Attain Political Objectives,” e-ir, June 22, 2014, accessed March 6, 2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/22/is-terrorism-an-effective-way-to-attain-political-goals/.

[38] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 71.

[39] Baracskay, “The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Analyzing the Position of Political Pragmatism in State Constructing and Activism,” 530-531.

[40] Max Abrahms, “The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited,” Comparative Political Research 45(3) (2012): 374.

[41] Freilich, “Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Coverage: How Efficient?” 369.

[42] Hamas, “A Doc of Common Ideas and Insurance policies,” Hamas Islamic Resistance, Might 1, 2017, accessed March 5, 2021, https://hamas.ps/en/post/678/A-Document-of-General-Principles-and-Policies.

[43] Hamas, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Motion.”

[44] Mahjoob Zweiri, “The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Main Earthquake,” Third World Quarterly 27(4) (2006): 678.

[45] Jennifer L. Jefferis, Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and its Future within the Center East (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2016), 123.

[46] Byman, “Is Hamas Successful?” 71.

[47] Jefferis, Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and its Future within the Center East, 123.

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