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Are Non-democracies Extra Inclined to Coups than Democracies in West Africa?

Within the huge and storied political panorama of Africa, the West African sub-region has sure distinctive options that set it aside from the remainder of the continent. Boafo-Arthur (2008) known as it the “heartbeat of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”, claiming that it served because the vanguard of armed resistance in opposition to colonial rule. Liberia, which gained independence in 1847, is the oldest African republic. Ghana was the primary nation in Sub-Saharan Africa to realize independence in 1957. Guinea’s independence from France in 1958 proved to be the primary in a line of dominoes that in the end led to the independence of the remaining Francophone international locations within the continent. 

Sadly, West Africa additionally has the doubtful distinction of ushering in a phenomena that might plague the continent for the following sixty years; regime modifications by technique of army coup d’états. The literature consensually agrees that the Togolese coup of 1963, which noticed the assassination of prime minister Sylvanus Olympio, set the blueprint for all of Africa’s forays into army adventurism (Owusu, 1971; Conteh-Morgan, 2000; Boafo-Arthur, 2008; Kemmence, 2013). McGowan and Johnson (1984) would describe West Africa as ‘the area par excellence of the army coup d’état’ for having the best document of coup exercise in comparison with wherever else on the planet. McGowan and Johnson (1984) and Kemmence (2013) famous that, regardless of encompassing one-third of all majority-ruled African States, this sub-region has seen about half of all profitable coups d’états, one-third of all reported coups and  half of all reported plots within the continent. The one nation out of the 16 international locations within the sub-region that has by no means witnessed a army coup to this date is Cape Verde. 

What makes West Africa susceptible to coups? This paper, upon synthesis of the surveyed literature, recognized three broad causes, specifically ethnic fractionalization, lack of financial progress and army dominance over civilians.  All of those elements work in synergy with one another, creating an setting conducive for coup actions.

The connection between social cleavages between ethnic teams and the persistence of coups was additional operationalized by Jackson (1978) into three parts; social mobilization, cultural pluralism and political elements such because the prevailing political social gathering system and mass participation. In keeping with him, whereas a single-party system has a stabilizing impact on governments in international locations that just lately attained independence, a variety of political events can create a turbulent socio-political ecosystem. When confronted with electoral turnout, this destabilizing impact brought on by a multi-party political equipment is additional amplified by the dominance of a single ethnic group. Most West African international locations affiliate political events with ethnic groupings (Kemmence, 2013). This partisanship seeps into the army, creating situations for rivalries that in the end end in coups and counter-coups. A distinguished instance of a multi-party system and ethnic fractionalization catalyzing instability was in Benin after it declared independence from France. The interval between 1960 and 1972 noticed a cavalcade of regime modifications by coups, with figures like Hubert Maga, Sourou-Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe-Tometin rising to energy; all three of those males represented a distinct political social gathering, and every political social gathering predominantly represented a distinct ethnic group coming from totally different areas in Benin. However, freshly unbiased Niger was dominated for probably the most half by a single-party regime, which managed to stabilize the rebellion of the much less dominant Touareg group in opposition to the dominant Hausa group. Despite the fact that the previous instance noticed larger success of coup-realization, it’s simple that ethnic fractionalization has created situations for the plotting and try (if not success) of coups in each these international locations. 

Coming to financial efficiency, Johnson and McGowan (1984) supplied empirical proof which recommended that financial underperformance was a big issue that might doubtlessly result in coups. Additionally they argued that some measures of optimistic financial efficiency, resembling excessive ranges of productive employment, strong financial progress, sound export efficiency and diversified commodity exports, are extremely stabilizing. Nonetheless, Adebayo (2002) challenged this evaluation by pointing to Nigeria and Togo repeatedly present process regime modifications and (failed) coup makes an attempt, regardless of their outstanding financial progress. Clearly, there’s some lack of consensus within the literature relating to the influence of financial underperformance on the chance of coup makes an attempt, although this paper argues that Johnson and McGowan (1984) made a extra compelling case by learning underlying antecedents to coup actions in all international locations of Africa.

Lastly, army dominance over civilians additionally performs a task in subverting the socio-political order. Janowitz (1977) and Kemmence (2013) each addressed the nigh non-existent civil-military relations in West Africa; Kemmence argued that the repetitive army coups in Guinea-Bissau have been a direct results of the dearth of civil-military relations. He argued:

…although the nation has a civil authorities, the army dictates and controls each transfer of the civil rulers who’re really the puppets of the generals within the army

A studying of West Africa’s post-colonial political historical past means that the army and civilians always feud with one another, with each teams having their very own inner cleavages and energy struggles, ultimately leading to tumultuous civil discord. Finally, the army nearly all the time emerges because the dominant actor in occasions of battle. This leads us to query, why would the army wish to intervene within the political functioning of those international locations? McBride (2004) chalks it down to non-public greed, motivated by the wealth and privileges loved as soon as they acquire energy and management over the state. How is it that the army is ready to simply overpower civilians on this sub-region? Adebajo and Rashid (2002) contend that it’s due to the huge assets on the disposal of the army, establishing a correlation between army spending and occurence of coups. Nigeria, as an illustration, has probably the most resourceful army in all of Africa they usually’ve reported probably the most coup plots (together with failed makes an attempt and successes) at fifteen as of 2018. 

Are the relentless coups undermining democratization in West Africa?

In keeping with the Polity IV scores of West African nations between 1958 to 2018, 7 out of 15 international locations (excluding Cape Verde) have, in some unspecified time in the future, acquired a rating that might place them in every of the Polity IV classes; autocracy (-10 to -6), closed anocracy (-5 to -1), open anocracy (0 to five) and democracy (6 to 10). These international locations are Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Nigeria. Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea and Mauritania have acquired scores in some unspecified time in the future on this interval that positioned their regime sort as both autocratic, closed anocratic or open anocratic. Nonetheless, they by no means scored excessive sufficient to be thought-about democratic. Togo is the one nation to not have progressed past the ‘closed anocracy’ regime sort. Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone have undergone all regime varieties apart from closed anocracy, whereas Senegal has undergone all regime varieties apart from open anocracy. Scatter-plots illustrating intervals of every regime sort for every nation is offered in Appendix 1, graphs 1 to 4. An inspection of the scatter-plots demonstrates that, for many international locations, their standing as a ‘democracy’, ‘anocracy’ or ‘autocracy’ just isn’t outlined by a steady time-period, however is moderately dispersed all through their historical past. Ghana, as an illustration, began as an autocracy post-independence and, following a 1978 coup, was categorised as a democracy. Nonetheless, following the 1981 coup, Ghana as soon as once more regressed into an autocratic regime. Over time, the regime grew to become progressively much less autocratic, till it achieved full democracy as soon as it attained some stability (Appendix 2). Related tendencies will be noticed in Gambia, Liberia, Mali and a number of other different international locations within the sub-region. This development is indicative of the destabilizing energy of coup d’états and the way they undermine the democratization of this sub-region. Boafo-Arthur (2004) and Conteh-Morgan (2000) argued that the political instability shepherded by the tradition of militarism has jeopardized the institution of a gradual democracy within the sub-region.  The onset of the third wave of democracy within the early Nineteen Nineties did arouse some optimism that the sub-region is on the verge of reaching political equilibrium. Nonetheless, the expectations of a steady democracy are but to materialize (Boafo-Arthur, 2004). Côte d’Ivoire is one instance of a rustic that was an aspiration within the sub-region for sustaining stability and progressing in direction of a full democracy. Sadly, the nation imploded following a number of coup makes an attempt from 1999 to 2002. Sierra Leone and Liberia are nonetheless making an attempt to forge a steady political mannequin after landmark elections in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The elections within the two international locations additionally marked the tip years of civil wars. In 1997, Liberia had an election (albeit, underneath questionable circumstances in response to Boafo-Arthur (2004)) to finish the civil struggle that began in late 1989. Charles Taylor received that election however the instability in Liberia (largely inspired by Taylor himself), continued till he was pressured into exile in Nigeria in 2003. In a nutshell, the West African sub-region has struggled to realize sustained democracy within the face of fast regime modifications.

Figuring out some analysis gaps: Are democratic regimes actually much less inclined to coups in West Africa?

As talked about within the earlier sub-section of the literature assessment, an amazing majority of the nations in West Africa have skilled the total spectrum of regime varieties, starting from autocracy to democracy, of their brief post-colonial historical past. Moreover, all 15 international locations underneath examination, besides Senegal, confronted at the very least one reported coup try in every of the regime varieties that they skilled. That is illustrated within the scatter-plot given in Appendix 3. Senegal skilled just one coup try on this interval, when Mamadou Dia did not overthrow sitting president Leopold Sedar Senghor in 1962. Senegal had a polity rating of -4 in 1962 (making it a closed anocracy that 12 months) and has not confronted a coup try since. 

On condition that lots of these nations have skilled at the very least one coup in every regime sort, this sub-region could be ideally suited for learning whether or not democratic regimes are actually extra inclined or resilient to coups than autocratic and anocratic regimes. Nonetheless, only a few research have empirically explored this sub-region particularly (outdoors of research trying into Sub-Saharan Africa as an entire) and investigated country-wise results. 

The connection between regime varieties and their susceptibility to coup makes an attempt is a contentious one among students; Tulaslem (2015) referred to it as an “empirical conundrum that continues to be unsolved”. Huntington (1968), Linz (1978), and O’Donnell (1979) all argue in opposition to the standard knowledge that democracies are resilient to regime instability, primarily as a result of they invite political pluralism. The domineering presence of curiosity teams tends to weaken the state from finishing up its capability to manipulate successfully. When financial modernization outpaces the event of democratic political establishments, the emergence of political order and stability turns into much less probably. Because of this, coups, revolutions, and the breakdown of democratic establishments are probably eventualities in extremely democratic regimes. Powell et al (2017) discovered that younger democracies are extra predisposed to coup makes an attempt than both civilian authoritarian regimes or older democracies. Whereas none of this literature focuses on West Africa particularly, the findings could be related to establishing a priori expectations of this paper’s closing outcomes. 

However, fashionable empirical research by Casper and Tyson (2014), Marinov (2014), Tusalem (2015) and Bell (2016) have supplied adequate proof utilizing a world pattern that democracies (with the next Polity IV rating) are much less coup-prone than autocracies; Bell (2016) has additionally validated this speculation for Sub-Saharan African nations individually. In truth, probably the most convincing argument for anticipating West African democracies to be much less coup-prone than autocracies will be discovered within the aforementioned Powell et al. (2017) paper, which basically echoes the literature surveyed thus far:

 …we recall that coup perpetrators should come from both the army or different elites within the state equipment—individuals who already take pleasure in a privileged standing in society. Thus, leaders looking for regime change are more likely to exhaust different authorized channels earlier than perpetrating a coup and are most probably to take action solely after they count on their management to trigger a big enchancment in the established order

Moreover, all of the aforementioned literature concedes that coups come up extra regularly when coup plotters have real objectives of making each financial prosperity and political legitimacy. Financial prosperity will be achieved by opening an financial system to international assist, funding, and worldwide enterprise transactions-all of that are strongly tied to democracy (Tusalem, 2015; Powell et al., 2017). Thus, it’s cheap to imagine that in West Africa, coups are extra typically plotted to both escape conditions of non-democracy or to strengthen democracy, since this sub-region is economically disadvantaged and politically unstable. This paper shall, due to this fact, hypothesize that the percentages of a coup try occurring in an autocracy or anocracy is bigger than that of a democracy, and try to validate this speculation.

Analysis Questions

A assessment of the literature leads us to the next speculation:

H1AAutocracies and anocracies have larger odds of going through a coup try than democracies. In different phrases, as the standard of democracy will increase, the extra resilient to coups a West African nation is.

The opposite hypotheses this paper can be validating are:

H1BFinancial progress reduces the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic

H1CElevated ethnic fractionalization will increase the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic.

H1DElevated army resourcefulness will increase the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic

Empirical Evaluation

Information and analysis design

With a view to check the aforementioned hypotheses, this paper shall analyze an unbalanced panel information of 15 West African international locations from 1958 to 2018. Since Cape Verde has not confronted even a single coup try on this timeframe, we have now excluded it from the evaluation. It’s because there isn’t any variability on this topic that may give further insights when analyzing fixed-effects. This paper will make the most of a logistic regression and check it for nation fixed-effects and random results, as a consequence of the truth that the dependent variable is binary. On condition that we’re analyzing panel information, the unit of study is country-years. All statistical analyses have been carried out on the StataMP 14.1 statistical package deal.

Practical type of fastened and random results logistic mannequin and easy instinct behind deciphering the coefficients

Assuming that the panel information has N international locations for T time intervals, the useful type of the logistic ‘unobserved results’ mannequin is as follows:

e(pit / 1 – pit) = αi + β0 + Xitβi = 1(1)N,t = 1(1)T

Right here, pit is the conditional likelihood that at the very least one coup can be tried in a rustic in 12 months t, given Xit, β and αi. Due to this fact, pit / 1-pit , is the percentages that at the very least one coup can be tried in that country-year.

Xit is the 1xk matrix of unbiased variables. 

β is the kx1 matrix of parameters.

β0 is the intercept time period.

αi is known as ‘the unobserved impact’. This will embrace, as an illustration, some unobserved historic or institutional elements for some nation i. Within the fixed-effects mannequin, we assume that αi is correlated with some or the entire explanatory variables. Nonetheless, within the random results mannequin, αi is uncorrelated with the matrix of unbiased variables. 

Now, for each fashions,

 pit / 1 – pit = eαi + β0 + Xitβ

Due to this fact, a one-unit enhance within the worth of unbiased variable Xitj will end in a eβj issue change within the odds, ceteris paribus. If 0<eβj<1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in decreased odds that at the very least one coup can be tried in a country-year. If eβj>1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in elevated odds that at the very least one coup can be tried in a country-year. Right here, eβj would be the coefficients on every of the unbiased variables within the closing estimation outcomes, and is known as the odds-ratio.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is “coup try” and was drawn from Powell and Thyne[1], who describe coups as “makes an attempt by the army or different elites throughout the state equipment to unseat the sitting head of presidency utilizing unconstitutional means”. This paper defines “coup makes an attempt” as a dichotomy, distinguishing between these country-years the place a coup try was not skilled (0) from these by which the country-year skilled at the very least one try (1). This paper included coup makes an attempt that succeeded or failed, just because the goal is to clarify the elements that result in coup makes an attempt moderately than the end result of an try. 

Impartial variables

a) This paper utilized the Polity IV[2] as a proxy to measure the standard of democracy in every country-year. A Polity rating starting from -10 to -6 locations a regime as an ‘autocracy’ (auto), -5 to -1 as a ‘closed anocracy’ (closed_ano), 0 to five as an ‘open anocracy’ (open_ano) and 6 to 10 as a ‘democracy’ (demo). Slightly than utilizing the Polity rating to measure the standard of democracy, this paper shall as a substitute denote the regime sort for every country-year. That is executed to obviously and higher distinguish regime varieties, and to conclusively check our speculation. Thus, the resultant ‘regime sort’ variable is an ordinal categorical variable which will be cut up into 4 dummies; for this evaluation, we can be utilizing the ‘demo’ dummy because the reference group. It’s anticipated that the coefficients (or odds-ratio) on the three named dummy variables can be larger than 1

b) ‘Financial progress” (GDPPC) is denoted by the GDP per capita (US$, present costs). This information was acquired from the World Financial institution database[3]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable can be lower than 1.

c) Ethnic fractionalization (EF) is measured utilizing the Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization supplied by the Dataverse database[4] for every country-year. The Index ranges from 0 to 1 and the upper the worth of the index, the larger the ethnic fractionalization. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable can be larger than 1.

d) Army Spending (MS) of every country-year (in million US$, present costs) will act as a proxy for army resourcefulness. The information was acquired from the SIPRI Army Expenditure Database[5]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable can be larger than 1.

Estimation Outcomes

The entire variety of country-years current within the panel information is 867. Nonetheless, as a consequence of lacking values, solely 688 observations have been appropriate for evaluation. The logistic regression output is supplied in Appendix 4. The coefficients symbolize the percentages ratio related to the variable. Mannequin 1 introduces nation random results whereas mannequin 2 introduces nation fastened results. Each fashions have a excessive sufficient chi-square statistic to point the general significance of the fashions. The pseudo R-square of the fastened results specification is 0.054 which signifies an honest however not glorious match. 

By way of the estimation of the coefficients, the outcomes are constant throughout each specs. In each fashions, the estimated coefficients on the three regime varieties are larger than 1. In different phrases, if a rustic switches from being a democracy to an autocracy or anocracy, the percentages of that nation going through a coup try will increase. This consequence aligns with a priori expectations, and the “regime sort” variable is statistically important in each fashions. 

Equally, in each fashions, the estimated odds-ratio on the variable GDPPC is lower than one. In different phrases, financial progress reduces the percentages {that a} nation will face a coup try in a given 12 months. This consequence aligns with a priori expectations, and this variable is statistically important in each fashions. 

The estimated coefficient on the variable EF is bigger than one in each fashions. Thus, elevated ethnic fractionalization in a rustic will increase the percentages of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. Nonetheless, this variable is just statistically important within the nation fixed-events specified mannequin. That is most likely as a result of the fixed-effects mannequin will contemplate variability in ethnic fractionalization inside international locations versus between international locations just like the random-effects mannequin does. Thus, it might probably result in modifications within the calculation of the usual errors of the variables.

The estimated coefficient on the variable MS is bigger than 1 in each fashions. Thus, elevated army resourcefulness in a rustic will increase the percentages of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. This variable is statistically important in each fashions. 

Deciding on acceptable specification: Aikake Info Standards (AIC) and the Hausman Check

The fixed-effects mannequin has a decrease Aikake Info Standards (494.26) than the random-effects mannequin (565.56). Due to this fact, the fixed-effects mannequin is a extra appropriate specification than the random-effects mannequin. To additional set up that the fixed-effects mannequin is the extra acceptable specification, the Hausman Check was carried out. The chi-square statistic was excessive sufficient that we may reject the null speculation that the random-effects mannequin is acceptable at 5% degree of significance. Because of this, all of the variables (together with EF) are statistically important if we contemplate the fixed-effects specification. The outcomes for the Hausman Check are given in Appendix 5. 

The variance affect elements (VIFs) for the unbiased variables are additionally supplied in Appendix 5; since all of the VIFs are beneath 10, we are able to reject the presence of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables. The VIFs are additionally supplied in Appendix 5. 

Solidifying the connection between regime varieties and their resiliency to coup makes an attempt: Cross-tabulation, Pearson’s chi-square check for independence and rank-biserial correlation

The cross-tabulation in Appendix 6 reveals the frequency distribution of country-years in response to ‘coup try’ and ‘regime sort’. Democracies have the bottom relative frequency of country-years the place at the very least one coup was tried out of all regime varieties (9.68%), adopted by closed anocracies (13.71%), then open anocracies (18.55%%) and eventually autocracies (58.06%). Solely 6.28% of democratic country-years have seen at the very least one coup try, whereas 19.2% of autocratic country-years have seen at the very least one coup try. 

The Pearson’s chi-square check statistic to check for independence between the 2 categorical variables is given as:

χ2 = N∑i,j pi * pj (((Oi,j / N) – pi * pj) / (pi * pj))2I = 1(1)r , j = 1(1)c

The place r is the variety of rows (on this case, 2) and c is the variety of columns (on this case, 4) within the two-way contingency desk. Right here, Oi,j is the variety of observations within the ith row and jth column. is the full variety of observations (867). Lastly, pi is the marginal relative frequency of row i 

and pis the marginal relative frequency of column 

If the null speculation is true that the prevalence of a coup try is unbiased from the regime sort in a country-year, then the check statistic follows a chi-square distribution with (r-1)(c-1) levels of freedom (which is the same as 3 on this case). Right here, the Pearson’s chi-square check statistic is excessive sufficient that we are able to reject the null speculation that the prevalence of a coup try is unbiased of regime sort in any respect typical ranges of significance.

Nonetheless, the Pearson’s chi-square check doesn’t present any info on the magnitude and course of the connection between the 2 variables. The rank-biserial correlation coefficient, which is a particular case of the Somers’ D measure, is an index of affiliation between a binary nominal variable (coup try) and an ordinal categorical variable (regime sort). The measure is calculated as:

rrb = (NC ND) / (NC + ND + NT )

The place,

NC=303*17+303*23+303*12+148*23+148*12+113*12=22292 is the variety of concordant pairs

ND=72*148+72*113+72*179+17*113+17*179+23*179=40761 is the variety of discordant pairs

NT= (743*124)- NC– ND=29079 is the variety of tied pairs

Thus, rrb= -0.20046238. This means that there’s a average, damaging affiliation between the prevalence of at the very least one coup try in a rustic 12 months and the regime sort.

The statistical analyses present adequate proof that democracies are extra resilient to coups than anocracies and autocracies in West Africa. The larger the standard of democracy, the much less is the chance of a coup try on this sub-region.


This paper validates the present literature on the consequences of ethnic fractionalization, financial progress and army resourcefulness on the chance of a coup try occurring in West Africa. Nonetheless, the susceptibility of democracy to army coups on a world scale continues to stay an empirical quandary, given the divisive nature of the literature exploring this particular relationship. It’s crucial to notice, nevertheless, that the findings of this paper are in step with comparable research executed in the complete Sub-Saharan Africa area. Whereas a world prescription might not be empirically substantiated, it’s clear that the antidote to the incessant regime modifications and army supremacy on this sub-region is democratization. Step one to herald democracy could be to fix the contaminated civil-military relations. Each civil leaders and the army should make concerted efforts to grasp their roles in nationwide service and safety. There’s additionally a must normalize the condemnation of army intervention into politics as undemocratic. Financial improvement and social cohesion amongst ethnic teams are additionally crucial to make sure political stability and sustained democratization of the sub-region.


Boafo-Arthur, Ok. (2008). Democracy and stability in West Africa: the Ghanaian expertise. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Division of Peace and Battle Analysis, Uppsala College. 

Conteh-Morgan, E. (2000). The army and democratization in West Africa: Points, issues, and anomalies. Journal of Political & Army Sociology, 341-355. 
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Jackman, R. (1978). The Predictability of Coups d’Etat. American Political Science Evaluation 72: 1262-1275. 

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Janowitz, M. (1977). Army establishments and coercion within the growing nations. College of Chicago Press.

Adebajo, A., & Rashid, I. (2004). West Africa’s safety challenges: Constructing peace in a troubled area. Lynne Rienner Writer. 

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Information Sources:

Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2021). Coup d’Etat Information Set [Dataset 3]. Retrieved from:

Heart for Systemic Peace. (2018). Polity4 Annual Time Sequence, 1946-2018. Retrieved from:

World Financial institution. GDP per capita (present US$). Retrieved from:

Drazanova, L. (2019). Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF).  (Harvard Dataverse, V2). Retrieved from:

SIPRI. (2020). SIPRI Army Expenditure Database. Retrieved from:

Appendix 1

Durations of Every Regime Kind in Every Nation from 1958-2018

Graph 1

Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset

Graph 2

Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset

Graph 3

Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset

Graph 4

Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset

Appendix 2

Ghana’s Polity Rating and Coup Makes an attempt (1960-2018)

Yr Polity Rating Coup Try
1960 -8 0
1961 -8 1
1962 -9 0
1963 -9 0
1964 -9 0
1965 -9 0
1966 -7 1
1967 -7 1
1968 -7 0
1969 -2 0
1970 3 0
1971 3 0
1972 -7 1
1973 -7 0
1974 -7 0
1975 -7 0
1976 -7 0
1977 -7 0
1978 0 1
1979 6 1
1980 6 0
1981 -7 1
1982 -7 1
1983 -7 1
1984 -7 1
1985 -7 0
1986 -7 0
1987 -7 0
1988 -7 0
1989 -7 0
1990 -7 0
1991 -4 0
1992 -1 0
1993 -1 0
1994 -1 0
1995 -1 0
1996 2 0
1997 2 0
1998 2 0
1999 2 0
2000 2 0
2001 6 0
2002 6 0
2003 6 0
2004 8 0
2005 8 0
2006 8 0
2007 8 0
2008 8 0
2009 8 0
2010 8 0
2011 8 0
2012 8 0
2013 8 0
2014 8 0
2015 8 0
2016 8 0
2017 8 0
2018 8 0

Be aware: “Coup try” is a dichotomous measure which assumes the worth 1 if a coup try occurred in that nation 12 months (no matter whether or not it was a plot, failed try or success)

Appendix 3

Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset and Powell and Thyne coup dataset

Appendix 4

Mannequin 1: Random-effects logistic regression 

 Coup  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf Interval]  Sig
Auto 2.758 1.125 2.49 .013 1.24 6.135 **
closed_ano 2.069 .893 1.69 .092 .888 4.82 *
open_ano 3.875 1.878 2.80 .005 1.499 10.016 ***
GDPPC .999 0 -1.98 .047 .998 1 **
EF 3.215 5.201 0.72 .47 .135 76.582  
MS 1.239 .077 3.44 .001 1.097 1.4 ***
Fixed .028 .039 -2.60 .009 .002 .415 ***
Fixed -13.57 46.623 .b .b -104.95 77.81  
Imply dependent var 0.151 SD dependent var   0.358  
Variety of obs   688 Chi-square   30.627  
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 565.563  
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Mannequin 2: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression 

 Coup  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig
Auto 2.767 1.196 2.35 .019 1.185 6.457 **
closed_ano 2.252 1.056 1.73 .083 .899 5.644 *
open_ano 3.371 1.696 2.42 .016 1.258 9.035 **
GDPPC .999 0 -1.73 .084 .998 1 *
EF 1.722e+10 1.952e+11 2.08 .038 3.866 7.671e+19 **
MS 1.21 .09 2.56 .01 1.046 1.4 **
Imply dependent var 0.151 SD dependent var  0.358  
Pseudo r-squared  0.054 Variety of obs   688  
Chi-square   27.402 Prob > chi2  0.000  
Akaike crit. (AIC) 494.262 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 521.465  
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Appendix 5

Hausman (1978) specification check 

 Chi-square check worth 11.969
 P-value .035

Variance Affect Components of unbiased variables

Variable  VIF
Auto 3.43
closed_ano 2.26
open_ano 1.47
GDPPC 2.58
EF 7.19
MS 2.64
Imply VIF 3.26

Appendix 6

Tabulation of Coup Regime  

Coup Autocracy Closed Anocracy Open Anocracy Democracy Whole
0 303 148 113 179 743
  40.78 19.92 15.21 24.09 100.00
  80.80 89.70 83.09 93.72 85.70
1 72 17 23 12 124
  58.06 13.71 18.55 9.68 100.00
  19.20 10.30 16.91 6.28 14.30
Whole 375 165 136 191 867
  43.25 19.03 15.69 22.03 100.00
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 20.27  Prob = 0.0001

Be aware: First row has frequencies; second row has row percentages and third row has column percentages






Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations

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